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JUSTIFYING SUBVERSION: WHY NUSSBAUM GOT (THE 
BETTER INTERPRETATION OF) BUTLER WRONG 
 
BY ORI J. HERSTEIN∗  
 
“If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as 
doubting anything.  The game of doubting itself presupposes 
certainty.” 
Ludwig Wittgenstein1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most common critiques directed at 
deconstructive and poststructuralist theories is that they are 
amoral – rejecting the validity of the very idea of norms and 
moral principles as grounds for justifying or criticizing 
political action and social structures – and that in rejecting 
the validity of the distinction between what is just and what is 
unjust, they “collaborate with evil.”2  By now, an almost 
canonical example of this common critique is found in Martha 
Nussbaum’s highly critical essay on the work of Judith 
Butler, titled The Professor of Parody.3  Here, I focus on 
Nussbaum’s critique and on Butler’s work as examples of the 
“common critique” and of deconstruction and 
poststructuralism in political theory.  I argue that the more 
modest and sounder understanding of Butler – taken as a 
deconstructive and poststructuralist theorist – is not 
susceptible to these accusations of amorality and 
collaboration with evil.   
     Even if Butler’s deconstructive poststructuralist theory 
does not, as a matter of fact, justify adopting any 
                                                 
∗ Visiting Assistant Professor, Cornell University Law School.   
For their comments on previous drafts of this article, I am 
grateful to Leora Bilsky and Noa Ben-Asher.  I am especially grateful to 
Katherine Franke from whose seminar this article originated. 
1 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY § 115 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von 
Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969). 
2 Martha Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 28, 
2000, at 37, 45.  
3 Id.  
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deconstructive agenda or subversive project of any specific 
political order, social practice, norm, or moral principle, it also 
does not necessarily undermine the ideas of moral and 
normative justification of specific acts of political 
deconstruction and subversion.  According to (what I take as) 
the better reading of Butler’s theory and of deconstructive 
theory in general, all subversion and deconstruction 
inherently take place in relation to a relatively stable set of 
background norms, structures of meaning, descriptive 
assumptions, practices, and values.  Such a background is a 
necessary enabling condition for any act of deconstruction and 
for the performance of any subversion or parody; a 
background that may, and often does, comprise moral values, 
norms, and principles that guide and justify specific 
deconstructive and parodic actions.  Therefore, while Butler’s 
theory, as an example of deconstructive and poststructuralist 
approaches to politics, does not consist of any such norms, 
values, or reasons justifying or rejecting any particular 
political action, Butler’s theory does not necessarily rule out 
grounding or justifying the undertaking of a particular parody 
or deconstructive agenda in value- or moral-driven practical 
reasoning.  Moreover, Butler’s theory of subversion is 
deconstructive at its core and as such, cannot be attributed 
with making generalized propositions, including metaethical 
propositions rejecting all principles of political morality.  
Hence, Nussbaum’s position – that Butler’s theory entails an 
amoral approach to political theory and action and therefore, 
“collaborate[s] with evil” – is erroneous.         
This essay begins with introducing Nussbaum’s 
critique of Butler’s gender theory (Section I); it then sets out to 
explore the role moral justification plays in Butler’s gender 
theory, which first requires delving into Butler’s work at some 
length (Section II).  Next, Butler’s account of how the gender 
structure of identity and social structures can be resisted and 
subverted is introduced (Section III); in the end, the merits of 
Nussbaum’s argument and of the “common critique” turn on 
choosing between two alternative interpretations of what 
poststructuralism is.  The first interpretation is labeled 
“universal poststructuralism,” the interpretation assumed by 
the common critique and in Nussbaum’s critique of Butler 
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and of poststructuralism and deconstruction in general.  The 
second interpretation is labeled “contextual 
poststructuralism.”  This second version is not susceptible to 
the common critique.  This essay argues that the “contextual 
reading” of Butler is better in tune with poststructuralism and 
deconstruction in general, and that when understood in its 
terms Butler’s gender theory is not susceptible to the common 
critique (Section IV).    
       
I. NUSSBAUM’S CRITICISM OF BUTLER OR 
THE “COMMON CRITIQUE” 
 
In her essay, Nussbaum poses the following challenge:  
 
Suppose we grant Butler . . . that the social 
structure of gender is ubiquitous, but we can 
resist it by subversive and parodic acts.  Two 
significant questions remain.  What should be 
resisted, and on what basis?  What would the 
acts of resistance be like, and what would we 
expect them to accomplish?4  
 
It is the first pair of questions that interests me here.  
In the most general terms, when Nussbaum asks on what 
basis Butler’s theory allows to choose and justify acts of 
subversion against what she calls the “ubiquitous social 
structure,” Nussbaum is in fact doubting (and later denying) 
whether poststructuralist theory allows for morally justifying 
or rejecting any particular political action or agenda.  
According to Nussbaum, “Butler cannot explain in any purely 
structural or procedural way why the subversion of gender 
norms is a social good while the subversion of justice norms is 
a social bad.”5 
Nussbaum makes two arguments in support of her 
criticism.  First, she claims that as a matter of fact, Butler 
simply does not attempt to justify the rightness of her political 
projects, but simply assumes they are just.  Examples of this 
absence of moral justification can be found in the chapter on 
                                                 
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
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gay subversion in Butler’s Bodies That Matter.6  There, Butler 
seems not only sympathetic towards subversion of the 
heterosexual-centric social structure, but also positions 
herself as part of this subversive political project.  She does so 
with no effort at justification.  The same is true of Butler’s 
discussion of the merits of gay marriage, which is conducted 
on the basis of the assumption that gay liberation should be 
promoted and persevered.7  Once again, Butler does not 
explicitly mention these moral principles, although one 
cannot but feel that they are presupposed in the background 
as the obvious motivation for the project.  Another example is 
found in Butler’s discussion of hate speech in her book 
Excitable Speech, where she argues that censorship of hate 
speech closes options for subversion, which are opened to the 
victim group, taking this as a reason for opposing 
censorship.8  Therefore, there seems to be some validity to 
Nussbaum’s first critique.  Nevertheless, such examples only 
demonstrate that as a matter of fact, Butler does not always 
justify her politics and subversive agendas.  They do not, 
however, prove that Butler’s theory inherently rejects the 
possibility of justifying or rejecting certain acts of subversion, 
parody, and deconstruction as virtuous or illegitimate.       
Nussbaum’s second argument in support of her 
critique is categorical, yet underdeveloped.  According to 
Nussbaum, Butler’s theory is adverse to the very idea of 
justifying political projects because such justifications are 
based on principles and ideals that are perceived to be good 
and serve as axioms for moral justification.  Examples of such 
ideals are human dignity, always treating people also as ends 
and not only as means, basic human needs, autonomy, and 
Nussbaum’s own favorite core political value, equality or 
respect.  The reason Nussbaum attributes to Butler’s rejection 
of any such moral values and principles is that, according to 
Nussbaum, Butler views them as “inherently dictatorial.”9   
                                                 
6 JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 121-42 (Routledge 1993) 
[hereinafter BODIES]. 
7 Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual? 13.1 
DIFFERENCES: A J. OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 14 (2002). 
8 See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE 
PERFORMATIVE 160 (Routledge 1997) [hereinafter EXCITABLE SPEECH].     
9 Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42. 
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The common critique is not Nussbaum’s only critique 
of Butler.  She also argues that the lack of ethical grounds in 
Butler’s writing has steered many feminists onto an amoral, 
non-practical, aesthetic, and almost autistic path, away from 
addressing actual, practical questions of gender injustice.  In 
addition, Nussbaum rails against Butler’s style of writing, 
which she views as sophistic and intentionally opaque.  
Nussbaum is also highly critical of the mode of political action 
Butler’s theory allows for – parodic and symbolic subversion 
rather than material change, which Nussbaum views as self-
indulgent and of little utility.  All three critiques have at least 
some  truth to them.  However, my concern here is only with 
that which I labeled the “common critique” – that Butler’s 
theory (and poststructuralism and deconstructive theory in 
general) rules out any and all moral justification for political 
action. 
 
II. BUTLER’S THEORY OF GENDER CONSTRUCTION 
 
In order to understand Nussbaum’s position, it is 
imperative to understand what she takes Butler’s gender 
theory to be.  In Bodies That Matter, Butler lays out her 
theory of how human bodies are always-already 
constructed into categories of gender.  In Excitable Speech, 
Butler makes a similar point by arguing, based on 
Althusser’s concept of interpellation,10 that we always-
already exist as recognizable subjects according to some 
ideology.  “[O]ne comes to ‘exist’ by virtue of this 
fundamental dependency on the address of the Other.  One 
exists not only by the virtue of being recognized but, in a 
prior sense, by being recognizable.”11   
                                                 
10 According to Althusser, people always exist as subjects of some 
ideology; we are always-already interpellated by or into some ideology.  
We enter ideologies through the process of interpellation, in which we 
accept the ideological framework as true, or in other words perceive 
ourselves as subjects of the ideology.  See Louis Althusser, Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), in LENIN 
AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 87-126 (Ben Brewster trans., Monthly 
Review Press 2001) (1971).  
11 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 160.   
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Since people are always-already constructed as such 
(as people), it follows that there is no such thing as a natural 
or pre-social human essence.  This is because before being 
constructed as social/speaking (i.e. as symbolic beings, under 
Lacanian theory) or interpellated beings (under an 
Althusserian approach), we were not people.  There is no 
natural (i.e. pre-social) state of personhood, and therefore, 
there is no such thing as a human body “belonging” to a 
person that is not already socially constructed.   
Furthermore, for Butler, human bodies are not only 
always-already socialized, but are also similarly gendered 
(through ongoing processes of performance).  We never 
encounter our body as ours (in the sense of being the body 
of a person) prior to its being categorized as the body of a 
female or a male.  Moreover, we always encounter ourselves 
(as people) as already-categorized by gender. 
While in Excitable Speech Butler draws more on 
Althusser’s theory of ideology and interpellation to explain 
this idea of being already-constituted, in Bodies That 
Matter, she draws more on a Lacanian theory of child 
development.12  Regardless of the psychological or 
sociological explanation, the basic idea is the same – we 
exist always as already-constructed beings.  When a baby 
turns into a person, it does not transform into a generic 
person, but is always transformed into either a he or a she.  
In becoming a person, one is labeled as either male or 
                                                 
12 According to Lacan, a person or subject is not “born” at birth.  At 
birth, a baby is yet to be a person; it is only disjointed bodily and sensual 
sensations.  A baby begins to form into a person only after it internalizes 
the image of the complete Other as its own (in the “mirror stage”) and 
later by entering the realm of the symbolic.  Here, the baby becomes a 
subject by internalizing the point of view of the Other, understanding the 
relation between itself and its own reflection not as a sameness relation, 
but as a symbolic one, i.e., as that of a signified and signifier.  In this 
stage, the baby also internalizes the structure of language: by searching 
for the approval that the image in the mirror is really its own image, the 
baby internalizes the logic of language, which requires the point of view 
of the Other to stabilize and ratify the signifying relations. Jacques 
Lacan, The Mirror Stage, in ECRITS: A SELECTION 3-9 (Bruce Fink and Alan 
Sheridan trans., W. W. Norton Company Inc. 1977) (1966); SAMUEL 
WEBER, RETURN TO FREUD: JACQUES LACAN’S DISLOCATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 
7-19 (Michael Levine trans., Cambridge University Press 1991).  
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female through the intersection of the psychological 
dynamic of child development and the heterosexual 
structure of kinship.13  
Distinctions between bodies predicated on “sex” are 
initially drawn on the basis of identifying a baby’s 
reproductive organs.  However, this physiological based 
categorization is not as neutral or natural as one may think.  
The category of “sex” does not function like categorizing 
people by blood type.  Being ascribed a sex, i.e. being born “a 
boy” or “a girl,” means being ascribed a whole identity that is 
constructed by social norms and which determines the course 
of one’s life.   
Furthermore, Butler points out that our gendered 
identity is closely interrelated with sexual orientation identity.  
Being ascribed a gender is interrelated with being ascribed 
one of the two heterosexual roles.14  According to Butler, 
being a “woman” always means being a heterosexual woman.  
The idea of a lesbian woman is adverse to the social construct 
of “woman”15 – it is, in a sense, unintelligible.  
It is important to note that neither the identity 
categorization nor the social meanings these identities entail 
are up to us.  We only exist, as the persons we are, after being 
constituted and molded according to these categories, 
categories that were molded prior to our birth by social norms 
we had no hand in establishing.  According to Butler,  
 
Once “sex” itself is understood in its 
normativity, the materiality of the body will not 
be thinkable apart from the materialization of 
that regulatory form.  “Sex” is not simply what 
one has, or a static description of what one is: 
it will be one of the norms by which the “one” 
becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a 
                                                 
13 Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of 
Sex, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157-210 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 
Monthly Review Press 1975).  Butler seems to accept Rubin’s kinship 
concept.  See, e.g., Butler, supra note 7. 
14 Rubin, supra note 13.       
15 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE xi-xiv (Routledge 1999) [hereinafter 
GENDER TROUBLE]. 
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body for life within the domain of cultural 
intelligibility.16  
Elsewhere Butler explains that “[t]he terms that 
facilitate recognition are themselves conventional, the effects 
and instruments of a social ritual that decide, often through 
exclusion and violence, the linguistic conditions of survivable 
objects.”17    
This preexisting and controlling social structure is 
what Nussbaum is referring to when she says that according 
to Butler, “the social structure of gender is ubiquitous.”18  
Assessing the validity of Nussbaum’s critique requires figuring 
out whether the ubiquitous social structure of identity, as the 
idea emerges from Butler’s poststructuralist theory, allows for 
opposing, critiquing, and resisting it “from within,” and if so, 
does Butler’s theory allow for morally judging certain 
resistance and subversion as just and others as wrong.  
Nussbaum, as a proponent of the common critique, believes 
that such judgments and justifications are ruled out by 
Butler’s account of social construction.  Nussbaum’s error 
derives from a mistaken understanding of Butler’s 
poststructuralist and deconstructive approach to the 
ubiquitous social structure of gender.       
 
III.  RESISTING THE UBIQUITOUS STRUCTURE 
“FROM WITHIN” 
 
A. Resistance and the Ubiquitous Structure – 
the Structuralist Account 
 
One problem with all-inclusive structuralist theories is 
that they lack both the ability to verify/criticize and 
justify/refute themselves.  According to the structuralist 
account of gender construction, we all always-already exist 
within an all-embracing and stable gender-constituting 
structure.  From this, it follows that any possibility of 
criticizing, or of even being aware of this structure, is 
impossible.  If we are constituted by and trapped within this 
                                                 
16 BODIES, supra note 6, at 2. 
17 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 5. 
18 Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42.  
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all-enveloping gender-constituting construct, which professes 
to be neutral, natural, true, just, and essential, it must follow 
that we (the would-be social critics) and our critical faculties 
are also similarly constructed.  Thus, how can we critique 
such a system, let alone resist it?  
Under such a closed all-inclusive structure, a 
constructed identity is not unlike a Kantian transcendental 
category.  One cannot perceive beyond the structure for it 
constitutes not only who one is, but also one’s categories of 
perception and one’s very ability to perceive and categorize.  
Since we are always-already constructed, we have no non-
constructed point of view from which we are free from our 
already constructed conceptual schema.  In gender terms, 
this entails that all we know and all we can know are gender 
and the existing gender relations.  Hence, a critical theory 
claiming that gender is anything less than a transcendental 
category (if not also natural, essential, and real) is nonsense 
within such a ubiquitous schema.  In addition, a critical 
structuralist theory is epistemically impossible for the social 
structure leaves no room for resisting or subverting it – 
neither from the “outside” for the structure is ubiquitous, nor 
from the “inside” for there is no space between our conceptual 
and critical faculties and the ubiquitous gender structure 
allowing, enabling, and setting the parameters for any critical 
reflection.  
An example of a structuralist account in the field of 
gender theory is found in the writing of Catharine 
MacKinnon,19 who argues that gender relations and gender 
itself are constructed within a closed, self-justifying system in 
which men hold the position of power and women are their 
objects of subordination.  This is a closed system of social 
construction in which all are assigned a stable identity and 
none can escape it.  
However, Butler is not a structuralist, but a post-
structuralist.  This entails that although Butler accepts that 
                                                 
19 For example, “men create the world from their own point of view, 
which then becomes the truth to be described.  This is a closed system, 
not anyone’s confusion.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, 
Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7.3 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN 
CULTURE AND SOC’Y 537 (1982).  
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identity is always-already constructed (i.e., there is no 
personhood outside or prior to structure since identity is 
only intelligible in relation to and within a structure) and 
that identity is subject to the Sausserean concept of 
meaning as difference rather than to principles of inherent 
essence or self-definition,20 Butler does not accept the idea 
of an all-inclusive structure of meaning that is complete and 
entirely stable.  According to Butler, resistance of the 
ubiquitous social structure is possible through identity 
subversion and parody. 
 
B. Resistance and the Ubiquitous Structure – Butler’s 
Poststructuralist Account of Identity 
 
1.  Performance and Reiteration 
 
For Butler, the construction of identity does not end 
with a person’s symbolic baptism (Lacan) or naming 
(Althusser), which initiates our “birth” as people.  According to 
Butler, “the rules that constrain the intelligibility of the 
                                                 
20 Ferdinand de Saussure claimed that the relation of the linguistic 
signifier to its signified, i.e. the relation which constitutes meaning in 
language, is not determined by some special inherent relation of 
reference between the sign and its signified.  There is nothing essential or 
natural in the meanings ascribed to different linguistic signs.  Meaning 
in language is rather a function of the relations between the various 
signifiers within the language.  Language is an array of signifiers and the 
relations of difference between them.  These differences between the 
signs are what determine their meaning, i.e. each signifier is ascribed a 
signified according to the former’s place within the “web of signifiers.”  A 
linguistic sign outside the web of difference relations is an oxymoron – in 
order for a sound or scribble to become a signifier, it must be part of a 
structure of difference.  
Under Saussure’s account of language, there is a place within 
the stable structure of meaning for supreme or privileged concepts upon 
which other meanings are grounded.  This is because in a web of 
differences, while signifiers are assigned meaning on the basis of 
difference relations and not due to any factors inherent to the signifier, 
meanings are still firmly assigned.  Thus, while Saussure’s theory of 
meaning as difference seemingly does away with the idea of a 
transcendent self-defining concept, it allows for a stable structure with 
clear nexuses of “power,” gravity, and centrality. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, 
COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally et al. eds., Wade Bas trans., 
McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1959).   
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subject continue to structure the subject throughout his or 
her life.”21  
However, the mere fact that the construction of our 
identity is an ongoing project does not mean a person can 
autonomously redefine his/her identity – that is a liberty we 
do not have.  Because the subject is always-already 
embedded, an autonomous and self-defining subject is 
impossible since there is no meaning or viable self outside or 
autonomous of the social structure of meaning.  Moreover, 
such an exercise in autonomy would be self-destructive for it 
would undermine the schema that constitutes and gives 
meaning to one’s own identity.22  Therefore, attempts to 
subvert or reject the ongoing construction of one’s identity 
come with great personal danger.  
 
If the subject speaks impossibly, speaks in 
ways that cannot be regarded as speech or as 
the speech of a subject, then that speech is 
discounted and the viability of the subject 
called into question.  The consequences of 
such an irruption of the unspeakable may 
range from a sense that one is “falling apart” to 
the intervention of the State to secure criminal 
or psychiatric incarceration.23  
 
Throughout our lives, we constantly reaffirm our 
identity by living according to our ascribed roles.  Butler 
explains this constant reconstitution as a product of a 
compulsive need to reaffirm and stabilize our identity as 
natural or essential.24  For example, gender identity is 
maintained and reinforced when we speak in a gendered way 
and participate and follow gendered institutions, practices, 
styles, norms of behavior, social activities, ontological 
                                                 
21 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 136. 
22 I am using figurative speech here in assuming a self that is prior to the 
constituted subject.  For Butler, there is no self who “owns” or “carries” 
its socially constructed self.   
23 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 136. 
24 Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: 
LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13, 24 (Diana Fuss ed., Routledge 
1991) [hereinafter Imitation]. 
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categories, etc., all of which we constantly perform.  This 
adherence to the gender matrix not only originates from the 
risk to one’s own intelligibility and the compulsion to affirm 
one’s own identity for fear of losing it, but also from the fact 
we are constructed to believe that the gender structure is 
natural, true, real, etc.  In other words, “the anticipation of a 
gendered essence produces that which it posits outside 
itself.”25  Butler also explains that the construction of identity 
is a temporal process, made up of actual specific acts.  
Identity “construction is neither a single act nor a causal 
process initiated by a subject and culminating in a set of fixed 
effects.  Construction not only takes place in time, but is itself 
a temporal process which operates through the reiteration of 
norms.”26   
The temporal, specific, and performative nature of 
identity construction is key to a poststructuralist approach to 
politics; it entails that, in a sense, the social structure itself is 
not frozen and stable as it is depicted under the structuralist 
account, but rather it “lives” in time and in the particular acts 
of its performance.  Put differently, by acting according to our 
constructed identity roles, we not only reconstruct our own 
identity, but are also recreating the very social structure to 
which we are adhering.  Moreover, we adhere to the social 
structure because we believe (wrongly) it is already “there” 
irrespective of our acceptance and performance of it.  Thus, 
according to Butler, by applying the language of gender and 
thinking through the conceptual schema of gender, we are in 
fact creating gender.  Following John Austin’s concept of 
performative speech acts, Butler claims that by using the 
language of the gender structure, we actually create not 
only our own identity, but also the gender structure itself.  
Butler’s claim – that the existence of the gender structure is 
constituted in its particular performances – derives from 
her understanding of gender structure as a form of 
language, which under deconstructive theory (as we shall 
soon see) exists only as reiteration.  The creation of identity 
through reiteration is what Butler means by her theory of 
performance.    
                                                 
25 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note8, at xv (emphasis added). 
26 BODIES, supra note 6, at 10. 
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Building on her theory of performance, Butler suggests 
we can also subvert the seemingly unbreakable self-recreating 
circle of meaning and performance.  According to her, “sex is 
both produced and destabilized in the course of this 
reiteration. . . .  This instability is the deconstituting 
possibility in the very process of repetition . . . the possibility 
to put the consolidation of the norms of ‘sex’ into a potentially 
productive crisis.”27  
2.  Iterability and the Instability of Structure 
 
Butler explains how the subversion and destabilization 
of the ubiquitous gender structure is possible by coupling her 
idea of gender performance as speech act with a 
deconstructive notion of language as reiteration. 
Jacques Derrida accounts for the role of iterability in 
language through the metaphor of the signature.28  The 
concept of a signature demands it be iterable, in other words 
for a signature to “work” (i.e., to be a signature as opposed to 
merely a scribble of someone’s name), it must be a duplication 
of the original Signature.  What makes a scribble into a 
signature is the fact that it is a reiteration of what we already 
know as The Signature.  People cannot sign their names 
completely differently every time; if they did, they would just 
be writing out their names, not signing it.  However, in 
practice we never encounter The Signature; all we encounter 
are specific occurrences of “it” (i.e., actual signatures).29  
Hence, while a scribble is only a signature if it is a reiteration 
of The Signature, in actuality, we can never point to or signify 
the original (i.e., The Signature), because the original 
categorically precedes even the first time we sign our names.  
Therefore, we are always left with a copy, which entails that 
                                                 
27 Id.  
28 JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC. 31-34 (Samuel Weber trans., 
Northwestern Univ. Press 1988) (1977). 
29 Even when we sign our name for the first time, that signature can only 
be a signature if it too is a reiteration of some nonconcrete original.  If we 
do not take it to be a first concretization of some original, it cannot be 
regarded as a signature.    
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the original only exists in its concrete duplications.  In other 
words, we are reiterating an original that is never “there.”30 
According to Derrida, language follows a similar logic to 
that of a signature.  When we use language, we do not invent 
it as we go along.  The concept of language necessarily entails 
that the words we use already have meaning.  Language does 
not erupt spontaneously from the speaking subject; it 
necessarily has a history and a structure of meaning that is 
independent of the speaking subject.  However, while the 
concept of language demands it have a “source” component 
that can be reiterated, we never encounter (in language) the 
original source of meaning we are reiterating.  Any attempt to 
express The Language or to capture The Meaning or The 
Signified of specific signs is doomed to fail.  Any such attempt 
will always only be a particular reiteration, a signifier, and a 
token of the unattainable original signified or type.  We search 
for The Source, but can only encounter “The Source”; we 
aspire to The Meaning, The Signified, or The Signature, but 
can only attain “The Meaning,” “The Signified,” or “The 
Signature.”  As Butler explains, “One speaks a language that 
is never fully one’s own, but that language only persists 
through repeated occasions of that invocation.  That language 
gains its temporal life only in and through the utterances that 
reinvoke and restructure the conditions of its own 
possibility.”31  Hence, language is always in limbo – in one 
sense, it is a source of meaning that is drawn upon and 
reiterated in specific language use (“One speaks a language 
that is never fully one’s own . . . .”), and in another sense, it 
exists only in particular uses (iterations).  Thus, while 
language is reiterable, it is also nothing more than iteration.      
Butler’s theory of performance draws on Derrida’s 
account of language.  When we reconstruct our identity 
through performing and adhering to the language and the 
conceptual schema of the social structure, we are in fact 
reiterating the social structure.  For example, when we act 
“like a woman,” we are acting like the model of The Woman 
embedded in the social gender structure.  We are acting as a 
                                                 
30 See GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15, at xv (indicating that the 
metaphor of “The Ritual” does similar work as the signature metaphor).   
31 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 140. 
58 BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY Vol. XVIII 
 
token of an archetype.  However, similarly to how language 
only exists in its reiteration, the gender structure we are 
reiterating only exists in our particular performance of it.  
“[G]ender [as well as sexual orientation] is a kind of imitation 
for which there is no original; in fact, it is a kind of imitation 
that produces the very notion of the original as an effect and 
consequence of the imitation itself.”32  This type of 
performance is subject to Derrida’s logic of the signature.  
Just as we never encounter The Signified or The Language as 
such, only “The Signified” and “The Language,” we never really 
encounter or fully reiterate the social structure or the type of 
identities it comprises, only imitations.   
The reason the concept of iterability is applicable to 
gender performance is that, according to Butler, the process 
of gendering takes place in language, in symbolism, and 
through our gendered conceptual schema via which we 
attribute meanings to the world.  Hence, in “acting like,” 
talking, and thinking in a gendered way, we are performing a 
reiteration of something that only exists in its iterations.    
Furthermore, just as every actual signature is slightly 
different from its other particular counterparts, so our acts of 
performance are all slightly different from each other.  In 
other words, there is room for incremental differences and 
variety in the reiterating activity.  We are like a community of 
Santa Claus impersonators: while all Santa Claus 
impersonators are different individuals, they are still all Santa 
Claus impersonators, and it is this relation of similarity that 
constitutes what the original Santa Claus – who does not exist 
– “is.”33  Thus, if a person acts or speaks in a manner that 
transgresses this relation of sameness and, therefore, is no 
longer identifiable as a reiteration (for example, one cannot 
impersonate Santa Claus by dressing up to look like a teapot), 
he/she in a sense falls “out of language” – his/her identity as 
a Santa Claus impersonator dissolves, and he/she will cease 
to “make sense” (as a Santa Claus).  Losing one’s identity as a 
                                                 
32 Imitation, supra note 24, at 21(emphasis omitted).  
33 A similarity that is perhaps best characterized by the Wittgensteinian 
concept of a “family resemblance.  See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 65-67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 
Macmillan 1972) (1953).  
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Santa Claus impersonator is not so tragic; in contrast, 
however, totally discarding gender may not only cause one to 
cease being a “he” or a “she,” but, because the conception of a 
human being is that of a gendered being, one also runs the 
risk of becoming some “it,” i.e., not fully human.  Thus, the 
extent of the space allowed for changing The Structure of 
identity through performance is limited to the realm in which 
that performance is still recognized as related to or as a 
variation of that structure. 
What remains to be proven is how the poststructuralist 
account succeeds where the structuralist account failed: how 
is subverting the “ubiquitous social structure” possible if we 
are always-already constructed by it and completely 
immersed in it?  
3. Agency 
 
Butler claims that agency is a necessary component of 
structure and identity construction because both depend, for 
their existence or intelligibility, on being performed.34  
According to Butler, the human subject is produced as an 
effect of the performance/structure relation and therefore, 
there is no subject prior to performance.35  Butler proposes 
that “agency begins where sovereignty wanes.  [One is free to 
act] to the extent that he or she is constituted as an actor 
and, hence, operating within a linguistic field of enabling 
constraints from the outset.”36  Our agency is therefore a 
product of construction – under the poststructuralist account 
of social structure, the human agent is an inherent effect as 
well as the cause of any structure.   
From this, it seems to follow that we are free to subvert 
the social structure “from within” because the agent is the 
creator of structure and as such, has the power to recreate or 
deconstruct the social structure through its performance.  
However, according to Butler, the extent of autonomy involved 
in this agency is highly limited.   
                                                 
34 Imitation, supra note 24, at 22-23. 
35 Id. at 24. 
36 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 16. 
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[T]he agency denoted by the performativity of 
“sex” will be directly counter to any notion of a 
voluntarist subject who exists quite apart from 
the regulatory norms which she/he opposes.  
The paradox of subjectivation . . . is precisely 
that the subject who would resist such norms 
is itself enabled, if not produced, by such 
norms.  Although this constitutive constraint 
does not foreclose the possibility of agency, it 
does locate agency as a reiterative or 
rearticulatory practice, immanent to power, 
and not a relation of external opposition to 
power.37  
Thus, while the social structure enables our agency, it 
also sets its limits.  In a sense, we are only free to perform the 
social structure and norms into which we are already-
interpellated.  
Still, Butler points out that being constituted by a 
discourse does not necessarily entail being fully determined 
by that discourse.38  Our agency is produced within the 
space created between the structure and its performance.  
Within this space, we are free to perform and reiterate the 
discourse of the social structure in ways that may stray 
from their former ideal discursive type.  Such 
transformation and subversion is possible so long as it is 
still identifiable as a reiteration of the discourse.  By 
employing this tactic of subversion, the agent exposes the 
seemingly natural structure, concept, or identity type as no 
                                                 
37 BODIES, supra note 6, at 15. 
38 “That cogito is never fully of the cultural world that it negotiates, no 
matter the narrowness of the ontological distance that separates that subject 
from its cultural predicates.” GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15, at 182 
(emphasis omitted).  “[A]ll signification takes place within the orbit of the 
compulsion to repeat; ‘agency,’ then, is to be located within the 
possibility of a variation on that repetition.  If the rules governing 
signification not only restrict but enable the assertion of alternative 
domains of cultural intelligibility, i.e. new possibilities for gender that 
contest the rigid codes of hierarchical binarisms, then it is only within 
the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion of identity becomes 
possible.”  Id. at 185 (emphasis omitted).  
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more than an effect of our constructed “anticipation.”39  In 
this, subversion is an act of deconstruction, deconstructing 
the elements of the social structure and of one’s own 
identity – it is the poststructuralist mode of political 
resistance.   
 
C.  The (Political) Effects of Subversion – 
Deconstructing Privileged Concepts 
 
1. The Idea of a Privileged/Sovereign Concept 
 
Structure, such as the structure of gender, most often 
entails centers of power supporting and bolstering the 
structure.  While no structure of meaning is completely frozen 
and entirely stable, structures always retain some degree of 
stability and inner logic, which are bolstered and expressed in 
their privileged concepts.  The “privileged concepts” may take 
many forms, depending on the nature of the structure.  They 
may be a principle, a constitution, a leader, a faith, God, the 
majority, etc.  For example, in political/legal constructs, the 
ruling concept is the sovereign; in algebra, it is the axiom.   
From within the structure, the privileged concept is 
perceived as self-justifying and natural.  It is fact, real, true, 
transcendent, self-evident, self-defining, clear and distinct, 
and celestial.  Because of their assumed “autonomy” and self-
justifying nature, privileged concepts seem not to depend on 
the structure they are imbedded in for their meaning, 
legitimacy, or truth-value; rather, the opposite seems true – it 
is the structure that depends on its core foundational 
concepts.  Just as the sovereign’s authority precedes and 
trumps legal authority, the privileged concepts precede the 
system of meaning.  Hence, in different structures, the “seat 
of power,” “the throne,” or in Lacanian terms, the “place of the 
real”40 may be inhabited by a different privileged self-justifying 
                                                 
39 Similarly to how the anticipation of the one “standing before law” 
creates the power of the law which bars his/her entrance, we create 
gender through our belief in its being true and essential.  Id. at xiv.    
40 According to Lacan, the place of “the real,” which is formed in our 
psyche as a resolution to the Oedipus complex, is essentially empty.  We 
fill this empty “place” with signs, which substitute and stand in the place 
of The Real, tragically and hopelessly trying to be The Real.  However, 
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“concept” or entity.  In any case, they all embody a 
transcendence typical of a sovereign: both preceding and 
embedded within the structure they “rule over.”  
2.  Deconstructing the Privileged or Sovereign Concept 
and Exposing Its Violence 
 
In subversive performance, we make evident the 
privileged concepts through becoming aware of their 
particularity, temporality, contingency, replaceability, and the 
fact that their legitimacy is not self-justifying, but dependent 
on their privileged position within the structure in relation to 
other concepts – similarly to how the meaning of a word is not 
essential to it but is derived from the contingent web of 
relations of linguistic differences.41    
A common method of deconstruction is to expose the 
constitutive dichotomy a particular structure is based on by 
implementing a Hegelian Master-Slave-like analysis.  The 
deconstructionist demonstrates how the sovereign concept is 
not self-defining, natural, or self-justifying, but rather 
dependent on a Siamese-twin concept, which is set up as the 
negation or duplicate of the privileged concepts.  For example, 
Butler demonstrates how the concept of heterosexuality 
derives its social status as natural, primary, and legitimate 
not from anything inherent in heterosexuality, but rather from 
its negation to homosexuality, which is deemed unnatural, 
derivative, and deviant.  This theory of meaning, based on 
relations and difference rather than essence, rejects the very 
                                                                                                             
since the place of The Real is empty and The Real unattainable, all that 
stands in “its” place can only try to signify “it.”  Yet, because in effect 
nothing is signified or rather it is the signification of “nothing,” such 
substitutions always fail. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN 
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Norton 1988) (1975).  
41 An example is found in Butler’s analysis of drag, which, according to 
her, indicates that gender identity does not necessarily correspond to 
only one sex and that all gendering is an act of “dressing up” according 
to some ideal.  For example, Butler argues that “[d]rag constitutes the 
mundane way in which genders are appropriated, theatricalized, worn 
and done; it implies that all gendering is a kind of impersonation and 
approximation.” Imitation, supra note 24, at 21.    
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idea of self-definition and the notion that a transcendent, 
autonomous, self-justifying concept is possible.  
By exposing such dichotomies through subversive 
performance, we diffuse our constructed and compulsive 
expectation that the structure and the identities it sets up 
have some inner authority we must adhere to and emulate.  
For example, Butler explains that because no sexual identity 
is natural, homosexuality is positioned as a derivative and a 
deviant copy of heterosexuality,42 thereby producing 
heterosexuality as the natural sexual identity in relation to its 
marginalized dichotomous concept “homosexuality.”  Through 
subversion, we expose constructed identity to be “drag” or 
performance rather than natural or essential; we learn that 
the production of some identities as natural and original 
always comes at the expense of others who are 
positioned/produced as deviant and derivative identities.      
  The next step in the deconstructive method is exposing 
the power and violence that artificially elevate one of the 
dichotomous concepts to the status of a sovereign or 
privileged concept.  This is usually achieved through bringing 
the “slave concept” to the fore and showing how the “sovereign 
concept” came to be thought of as such through the 
marginalization, oppression, and delegitimation of its 
dichotomous concept.  It is shown that only through the 
“erasing,” “silencing,” and delegitimizing of its dichotomous 
concept can a concept be transformed into a sovereign 
concept, regarded as natural, self-defining, original, and 
nonrelational.43          
If we accept this account of how “natural,” “original,” 
“self-justifying,” and “essential” concepts are produced, it 
follows that the introduction of such privileged concepts into 
political theory – often in the form of moral principles – will 
always also incorporate violence and subordination.  
Accordingly, violence is always prior and constitutive to any 
justificatory schema based on privileged principles.  Thus, 
principles of political morality, a type of privileged principles, 
                                                 
42 Id. at 17-21. 
43 The deconstructive analysis is conceptual, not necessarily entailing an 
actual historical process of subjugating one concept to the other.    
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do not derive their force from any innate essential morality, 
but from a pre-moral history of violence.   
After understanding how resistance of the “ubiquitous 
social structure” is possible via deconstructive subversion, it 
remains to be seen whether Butler’s schema of political action 
through subversion allows for distinguishing and 
discriminating between justifiable and non-justifiable 
subversive acts.  Nussbaum believes it cannot.        
 
IV. JUSTIFYING SUBVERSION 
 
A. “Universal Poststructuralism” and 
Nussbaum’s Criticism 
 
Nussbaum claims that Butler and Foucault reject 
moral imperatives and principles because according to them, 
such concepts are “inherently dictatorial.”44  I take this to 
mean that, in Nussbaum’s opinion, poststructuralist theory 
such as Butler’s or Foucault’s entails that all claims-based 
schemas of justification are always derived from some hidden 
arbitrary power structure, which acclaims one principle as 
innately true by marginalizing another (without justification, 
for the very structure of justification is predicate on the same 
type of violence – assuming a privileged metric as the 
standard of justification).  This is a “universal” version of 
poststructuralism because it makes a universal claim against 
all privileged concepts.     
Nussbaum points out that while Butler may target her 
deconstructive powers of subversion against truly unjust 
power structures, “[o]thers . . . might engage in the subversive 
performances of making fun of feminist remarks in class, or 
ripping down the posters of the lesbian and gay law students’ 
association.  These things happen.  They are parodic and 
subversive.  Why, then, aren’t they daring and good?”45  
Therefore, Nussbaum claims that 
 
[t]here is a void, then, at the heart of Butler’s 
notion of politics.  This void can look 
                                                 
44 Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42.   
45 Id. 
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liberating, because the reader fills it implicitly 
with a normative theory of human equality or 
dignity.  But let there be no mistake: for 
Butler, as for Foucault, subversion is 
subversion, and it can in principle go in any 
direction.46  
When Nussbaum claims that poststructuralist theory allows 
and even promotes subversion in favor of any ideology, 
practice, or group (be it good or evil) that is marginalized by 
(social) power, she assumes a universal understanding of 
what poststructuralism is. 
Nussbaum argues that Butler can afford not to tackle 
the fact that her philosophical program rejects moral 
justification because she writes to an audience of like-minded 
people who agree on what the social evils are, such as the 
mistreatment of women and gays.  In other words, the 
correlation that seems to exist between poststructuralist 
practice and morally justified political causes (e.g., the 
connection between Butler’s theory and feminism, which I 
hold to be motivated by some conception of right) does not 
derive from her gender or deconstructive theory itself.  
Moreover, Nussbaum seems to believe that an adherence to 
political agendas contradicts deconstructive and 
poststructuralist theory.  Put differently, according to 
Nussbaum, Butler is in fact a “confused moralist” who 
perceives herself as a postmodern poststructuralist of the 
“Nussbaumian” version (rejecting all truth and condemning 
all power), while in fact she is motivated by certain moral 
principles and a political agenda of gender and gay justice.47  
And, therefore, Butler’s practice is not compatible with her 
own theory because “universal poststructuralism” rejects any 
attempt at justification grounded in principle or norm.  It does 
not allow for morally justifying or condemning any power 
structure or subversive act.  For example, the tactic of 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 Butler herself offers another motivation, which seems to derive from a 
moral principle, when she writes: “If there is a positive normative task in 
Gender Trouble, it is to insist upon the extension of this legitimacy to bodies 
that have been regarded as false, unreal and unintelligible.”  GENDER 
TROUBLE, supra note 15, at xxiii. 
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subversion is open to the oppressed racial minority, as well as 
to the outlawed and socially ostracized neo-Nazi.   
 
1. Aversion to Power 
 
One possible answer in defense of poststructuralism 
from the common critique is to argue that poststructuralism 
does in fact contain a positive normative guiding principle 
after all – to be adverse to power.  Indeed, there is a seemingly 
implicit assumption in poststructuralist rhetoric and certainly 
in its deconstructive manifestations, that power should be 
challenged.    
The “aversion to power” answer derives from a 
universal understanding of poststructuralism, arguing that all 
(social, political) power, i.e., any relegation of certain concepts, 
principles, identities, etc. to other concepts, principles, and 
identities in the name of the latter’s value, self-justifying 
nature, autonomy, or justness, is somehow bad.   
However, the aversion to power answer suffers from 
the same inner contradiction as does the confused moralist – 
if all power is bad, should not this universal judgment also be 
rejected or at least problematized?  Is the aversion to all power 
not also an assertion that purports to be innately true or just 
and hence, must also be a product of some pre-ethical 
violence?  
Thus, while there seems to be an underlying 
assumption in deconstructive thought that power structures 
must be exposed and the marginalized elements within such 
structures should be freed from their relegation, there is no 
room in the universal version of poststructuralism for 
evaluating or differentiating just power structures from unjust 
ones or even for justifying the general principle of aversion to 
all power.  Hence, those who argue from morality or justice 
while using the poststructuralist schema in its universal 
version are simply confused, for they are not true (“universal”) 
poststructuralists.  I believe this is how Nussbaum would 
explain the relation between Butler’s theory and Butler’s 
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political convictions.  An account Butler herself has later 
come to reject.48   
2.   The Silent Answer – an Argument from 
Incommensurability 
 
Another possible answer to Nussbaum is to point out 
that she is playing a game of “intellectual solitaire.”  The 
poststructuralist and deconstructivist need not answer the 
moral question – on what principle or value does 
poststructuralism and deconstruction justify the rejection of 
moral principles and values?  The reason being that the 
question demands an answer in terms of (moral) justification, 
the very criterion and activity that is in contention.  The only 
proper answer a poststructuralist can offer Nussbaum is 
silence.  Any attempt to answer Nussbaum would necessarily 
require using absolutist categories and logic  – the framework 
set up by Nussbaum’s criticism.  Richard Rorty, in a different 
context, expresses this point aptly:  
 
If truths are really convenient fictions, what 
about the truth of the claim that that is what 
they are?  Is that too a convenient fiction? . . . I 
think it is important that we who are accused 
of relativism stop using the distinctions 
between finding and making, discovery and 
invention, objective and subjective. . . .  We 
must repudiate the vocabulary our opponents 
use, and not let them impose it upon us.49  
                                                 
48 JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 207-27 (Routledge 2004) [hereinafter 
UNDOING GENDER].  
49 RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE xviii (Penguin Books 
1999).  Jane Flax seems to be making a similar point in her work, The End 
of Innocence:  “Postmodernism is not a form of relativism because 
relativism only takes on meaning as the partner of its binary opposite – 
universalism.  Relativists assume the lack of an absolute standard is 
significant: ‘everything is relative’ because there is no one thing to 
measure all claims by.  If the hankering for an absolute universal 
standard were absent, ‘relativism’ would lose its meaning and force.” 
68 BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY Vol. XVIII 
 
This insistence on incommensurability may be what 
Butler is alluding to when she explains that while the 
aversion from the constraining and violent effect of 
normativity may lead many to “say that the opposition to 
violence must take place in the name of the norm, a norm of 
nonviolence, a norm of respect,”50 that is in fact not her 
position.  The notion that there must be some norm 
justifying her position imposes on Butler a distinction she 
rejects – that between norm and fact.51  It is the very 
language or logic of justification Butler seems to be 
rejecting.  
 I find the “silent answer” to the attempt to hold 
Butler’s theory to the requirement for justification only 
partially satisfactory.  In many ways, at least for me, this 
answer is just as much a reason for rejecting Butler’s 
theory as it is for accepting it.  A better answer, in my eyes, 
would focus on rejecting the formulation of Butler’s theory 
of political action (as a poststructuralist and 
deconstructivist theory) in universal terms, actively 
demonstrating why the common critique does not land any 
real punches.          
 
B. “Contextual Poststructuralism” 
 
Poststructuralism does not necessarily entail a 
rejection of all or any moral principles – a statement not 
contradicted by the fact that poststructuralism allows for 
the deconstruction of privileged principles.  I will offer two 
arguments for why this is the case.  The first derives from 
the particularistic and contextual nature of the 
                                                                                                             
Jane Flax, The End of Innocence, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 
445, 452-53 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., Routledge 1992).     
50 UNDOING GENDER, supra note 48, at 206.  
51 Id. See also GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15, at xxi (“We may be tempted 
to make the following distinction: a descriptive account of gender includes 
considerations of what makes gender intelligible, an inquiry into its 
conditions of possibility, whereas a normative account seeks to answer the 
question of which expressions of gender are acceptable . . . .  The question, 
however, of what qualifies as ‘gender’ is itself already a question that attests 
to a pervasively normative operation of power, a fugitive operation of ‘what 
will be the case’ under the rubric of ‘what is the case.’”).   
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deconstructive method/act.  The second maintains that 
under a deconstructive or poststructuralist approach, 
privileged concepts have a necessary enabling function for 
any deconstructive act or subversive performance.   
1.   The Particularistic Nature of the Deconstructive 
and Subversive Act 
 Conceptualizing poststructuralism in universal terms 
ignores the temporal, local, and contextual nature of the 
poststructuralist’s arguments.  When Butler deconstructs 
gender, she is better understood as deconstructing “gender” – 
as it is understood now, by a particular society, in a specific 
context, at a certain time and place.  Any act of subversion is, 
as we saw, always a particular act performed in a context by 
some specific individual within and in relation to some 
specific structure.  The same is true of Butler’s critique of 
“normative judgments” as indistinguishable from power-
saturated descriptive accounts.52  
In relating to Butler a universal rejection of all 
normative principles, all descriptive accounts, and all 
privileged concepts, one is making the error of universalizing 
and decontextualizing her deconstructive arguments.  Butler’s 
method of subversion as political resistance does not entail 
problematizing moral and normative principles, but rather 
“moral” and “normative principles” – not gender, but rather 
“gender”53; not normativity,54 but rather “normativity”; not 
human nature, but rather “human nature.”55  The “universal” 
version of poststructuralism is wrong.  Poststructuralist 
theory does not make universal claims, and poststructuralist 
theory does not reject all moral principles; at best, it can only 
reject the idea of “all moral principles” as it is understood in a 
specific context.  While Butler is not always sufficiently careful 
in clarifying the temporality and particularity of her 
deconstructive assertions, the better reading of her theory 
would insist on it.   
                                                 
52 GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15.  
53 Id. at xxi. 
54 UNDOING GENDER, supra note 48, at 206.  
55 Id. at 222.  
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One may also be tempted to erroneously deduce from 
the fact that deconstruction theory entails that all privileged 
concepts are potentially deconstructible that deconstruction 
theory also entails that all such concepts are contingent (and 
therefore, not really privileged).  This is a false move.  No 
particular act of deconstruction makes universal assertions 
and therefore, cannot be used as a basis for inducing a 
general claim.  This would be a move by a mind prone to 
universal reasoning and unattuned to the contextual nature 
of the deconstructive act.  And, even if we assume a pervasive 
potential for deconstruction, all we would be claiming is that 
all is potentially deconstructible.  
Furthermore, as we learned from Butler’s theory of 
identity subversion, for a subversion to take place or exist, it 
must take place in a particular subversive act.  There is no 
ruling, transcendent, pervasive, deconstructive logic outside 
concrete deconstructing and subversive acts or performances.  
Therefore, to conclude a general assertion, such as “all moral 
principles are a product of amoral violence,” from a theoretical 
potential for deconstruction is a muddle.  The subversion of a 
“privileged concept” only takes place if it is indeed actually 
successfully subverted.  Mere potential for deconstruction will 
not do to reject, destabilize, or subvert a privileged concept.  
Often one hears proponents of deconstructive and 
poststructuralist approaches dismiss outright any attempt at 
truth-talk, value-talk, etc. as theological, naïve, and violent.  
Often this is done out of an instinctive suspicion towards 
privileged concepts as such, and is not based on any careful, 
persuasive deconstructive or genealogical argument.  Those 
who demonstrate such tendencies are guilty of falsely 
deducing, through generalizing logic, actuality from 
potentiality; are often dogmatic; and by no means count as 
performing deconstructive or subversive acts (at best, they are 
unknowingly performing a parody of deconstructive acts).  
Even if Nussbaum is correct and Butler, in certain places at 
least, views all moral principles as “inherently dictatorial,”56 
the best version of Butler’s theory and of poststructuralism 
and deconstruction in general does not.                      
                                                 
56 Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42. 
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To clarify, pointing out the contextual nature of 
Butler’s theory of subversion does not entail that Butler’s 
arguments are always compelling, only that when they are 
not, they are so not because of the common critique.  In 
deconstructing broad foundational concepts such as “the 
political discourse of modernity,” the basic terms of which, 
according to Butler, “are all tainted and that to use such 
terms is to reinvoke the contexts of oppression,”57 Butler is 
not always convincing, but this is not due to some 
metaethical defect in her reasoning.  
 
2.   Privileged Concepts and the Background of 
Intelligibility  
 
Subversive deconstructive acts are made possible by 
some privileged principles and, therefore, such acts always 
allow for principle-based judgments.  Every subversive act 
and every deconstructive move are necessarily diversions from 
an otherwise relatively stable structure of meaning.  We do 
not live within deconstruction; no one can live according to 
Derrida’s “differance,”58 just as no one can be a subversion or 
a parody – we can only perform subversive and parodic acts.  
If we were to become the parody, “we” would become 
unintelligible.  In other words, the parodic dance on the 
margins, the subversive act, and the deconstructive argument 
are only intelligible because they are performed in relation to 
an otherwise stable background network of meaning.  Indeed, 
as we saw, in the case of identity subversion one retains 
his/her relation of sameness to the identity-type that is being 
subverted.  Moreover, one never subverts one’s entire identity 
or conceptual schema, but only aspects of it.  It is only under 
such circumstances that subversion becomes intelligible.  
Butler’s whole theory of subversion turns on the idea of 
subversion “from within,” wherein rejecting (intentionally or 
not) one’s entire identity or conceptual schema is 
meaningless.  This is due to the ubiquitous nature of the 
social structure and the fact that we are always-already 
                                                 
57 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 160.        
58 JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 1-28 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. 
of Chicago Press 1982) (1972).  
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constructed by it.  Hence, for their very intelligibility and 
possibility, subversive acts are enabled by a rich background 
that is relatively stable; a background that is not only not 
problematized by the subversive act, but is enabled and 
assumed by it.  
 The background of any deconstructive act or parody is 
made up of what is held (assumed) to be true.  One may be 
tempted to argue that this background is also always 
potentially prone to deconstruction and that it too must 
originate from a social construction, etc.  However, as I argued 
earlier (a) such general or universal claims have no weight in 
deconstruction; (b) such claims point only to a potential 
deconstructive move and do not establish or constitute such a 
move; and most importantly, (c) the deconstruction of any 
specific background or even of the idea of “background” or 
“context” will always in itself presume a (relatively stable) 
background of its own.  This is inescapable.   
Therefore, the poststructuralist (of the “contextual” 
persuasion) can continue to wonder about and pass judgment 
on the morality and immorality of specific subversions, power, 
and violence, even in a world that has stopped believing in the 
transcendent.  Moral- and principle-based reflection and 
judgment are not necessarily ruled out by poststructuralism 
and deconstruction.  Similarly to the rest of us, the moral 
principles the poststructuralist would employ in her practical 
reasoning and judgments would derive from the enabling 
background structure, only a small part of which would and 
could be the object of the deconstructive and subversive act 
that background itself enables.   
The necessity of some stable background of meaning 
does not entail that any specific privileged concept is essential 
to subversion and deconstruction, only that the intelligibility 
of deconstructive moves require some such concepts.  
Therefore, moral and normative concepts do not have to be 
assumed in such a background.  But, when such moves are 
practical, as is political subversion, the background concepts 
that enable such actions must include some reasons for 
actions, and among the most prominent of such reasons 
derive from moral principles and norms.  In fact, when 
“pushed to the wall,” Butler herself has evoked certain moral 
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norms for assessing and judging subversive actions; norms 
that are very much in vein with liberal-democratic-leftist 
ideology.59  Hence, while Butler’s theory does not necessarily 
require that the background enabling political subversion 
comprise moral principles, her theory clearly allows for it.          
 While Butler’s theory necessarily allows for moral 
principles or other privileged practical principles to direct our 
political actions, it also entails that we must always be wary of 
dogmatism.  Constant self-scrutiny and critical reflection is 
required.  We must always be aware that our certainties – 
enabling specific acts of parody, subversion, and 
deconstruction – may be subject to flux and that what we 
once held to be true and just may not be so today.  While this 
does not mean that what we hold to be just is necessarily 
arbitrary or coercive, it does mean that the possibility exists.   
 
CONCLUSION 
  
I tried to defend Butler and, more generally, 
poststructuralism and deconstruction from what I called the 
“common critique,” which claims that these theories are 
amoral and collaborate with evil.  I focused on Nussbaum’s 
critique of Butler as an example of the common critique and 
of a deconstructive poststructuralist theory because, beyond 
being a good example, Nussbaum’s essay has gained a 
substantial presence within a broad intellectual circle, often 
referred to as a classic, effective, and accessible repudiation of 
what is sometimes labeled “postmodern” thought.   
 I argued that the common critique is based on an 
erroneous understanding of Butler’s work (or of its better 
interpretation) as well as of poststructuralism and 
deconstruction theories in general.  The better and more 
careful version of these theories does not rule out all 
principles, including principles of political morality.            
 
                                                 
59 For example, in assessing the demand of the marginalized fascist for 
rights, Butler points out that “[i]t cannot be a good thing to invoke rights 
or entitlements to what one considers a ‘livable life’ if that very life is 
based on racism or misogyny or violence or exclusion.”  UNDOING GENDER, 
supra note 48, at 224.       
